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Summary
The Changing Cyclical Behavior of Wages and Prices: 1890—1976
The persistence of inflation during periods of high unemployment poses
the central problem for macroeconomic policy in coming years. The extent of
success in reducing both inflation and unemployment will depend strongly on
the short—run responsiveness of wage inflation to unemployment and excess
capacity. This paper studies changes in the cyclical responsiveness of
inflation from 1890—1976, and concludes that a given shortfall in production
relative to potential now "buys" a srnallev'reduction in the rate of inflation
than in the past. From 1890—1929, a one percent decline in industrial
production reduced inflation about .45%; for 1950—1976, the same output
decline is estimated to slow inflation only about .lX.
The analysis makes use of two methods to study the changing cyclical
behavior of inflation. Following an innovative study by Cagan, calculations
are made for wage and price inflation before and after eighteen business
cycle peaks. While inflation slows in almost every recession, the declines
in inflation in recent years are less pronounced than earlier, even when
controlling for business cycle severity. In a second section of the study,
econometric evidence is provided that also strongly supports the hypothesis
of increasing rigidity of wage and price Inflation over the business cycle.
In the last section of the paper, some possible reasons are cited
for the declining responsiveness of inflation to unemployment. Ironically,
successful macroeconomic policy might be in part responsible. To the extent
that activist macroeconomic policy breaks the link between current unemployment
and expectations of future unemployment, it is argued, unemployment today will
not induce wage cuts in contracts for future periods. Also, the tremendous
increase in duration and coverage of collective bargaining agreements is
suggested as an important force behind the shifting behavior of wages and
prices during the period of study.
Jeffrey Sachs




THE CHANGING CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR
OF PRICES AND WAGES:
1890—1976
The persistence of inflation during periods of high uneznployuent
poses the central problem for macroeconomic policy In the l970a. The
forecasts of major econometric niodcL ; I c)i th U.S. broadly ugree thaL a
sustained period of underemployment of resources will be required to
markedly reduce the prevailing rate of inflation. Indeed, many economic
commentators have surmised that a given level of unemployment now "buys"
a smaller reduction in the rate of inflation than in the past. In
technical terms, they suggest that the slope of the short—run Phillips
curve has declined over time.
In the vast econometric literature on the Phillips relationship,
surprisingly little formal analysis has been made of long—term changes
In the curve's parameters. Both methodological problems and data
limitations make a long—term analysis difficult. Two studies of the
secular trend in cyclical wage and price flexibility have recently
appeared. The studies use different analytic techniques and reach
opposing views on the changing inflation—unemployment tradeoff. In an
innovative study of wholesale price behavior in the 1920s and the post—
World War II period, Cagan [3] concludes that "wholesale prices show a
smaller decline in the recessions after 1948—49 than formerly," and that
"there has clearly been a gradual decline in price response to recessions
over the postwar period, except mainly for raw materials prices."1
Wachter [11, contrariwise, finds in a study of wages in the post-
World War II
2period that, "a broad range of wage equations reveals the growing
cyclical responsiveness of wage inflation."2 The results of course
are not directly comparable, :For Cagan's focus is on prices while
Wachter's is on wages, and the time periods of analysis.are different.
The discrepancy in conclusions seems to flow, however, from more
fundamental differences with the two analyses.
In this paper, two approaches are employed to compare wage and
price macrodynamics in the periols 1890-1930 and 1947-1976. Both
approaches strongly support the hypothesis of a decreasing responsiveness
of inflation to changes in aggregate demand. The approach in Section I
follows Cagan. in analyzing changes in the rates of wage and price
inflation from business cycle peaks to troughs. By comparing the
decelerations of inflation in pre- and post-World War II recessions
of nearly equal magnitude, a rough-and-ready measure of changing price
responsiveness is found. In Section II, econometric Phillips curve
estimates, akin to Wachter's, are presented. Attention is given to
the problems of simultaneous equations bias in standard Phillips curve
estimates. A new method of Phillips curve estimation is then described
and tested. Not only does the new approach readily yield consistent
estimates of the important parameters of the Phillips curve, but it
also provides an easy framework for some problems of macroeconomic
policy.
In Section III, we speculate on the causes for the increase
in cyclical wage and price rigidity. We suggest that two important
aspects of the diminishing slope of the short-run Phillips curve
are long-term wage agreements and the public's expectations after
World War II that monetary and fiscal authorities will intervene
to prevent price deflations and unemployment. Theoretical support
3for these hypotheses is cited, though empirical testing must await
further research.
I
From 1890 to 1976, the American economy experienced 19 business
cycles, as measured by the N.B.E.R. From 1890 to 1945, 14 business
cycles occurred, and S complete business cycles have transpired since
the end of World War II. Following Cagan, simple calculations are
made in this section of the paper to gauge the responsiveness of wage
and price inflation to changes in aggregate economic activity, as
indicated by the N.B.E.R. cycles. A measure of business cycle
severity is used to relate the sizes of wage and price fluctuations
to the amplitudes of the cycles.
Modern equations of inflation describe the rate of change of
wages and prices according to "equilibrium" and "disequilibrium"
components. For some parameter value, 4,, the postulated relation-
ship for wage change at time t is:
(1) t 4, (L - L) + 4, > 0
where w = !, the time rate of proportional change of wages at time
w dt
t, L and L are the demand and supply of labor, and w is the
expected rate of wage inflation. Typically, the excess demand for
labor, L - L5, is measured by an adjusted rate of unemployment or
other index of aggregate activity. The mechanisms of price change
may similarly be specified as =S (y5 - y) + p, where is
aggregate output.
4.e .eWhenever w or p is fairly sluggish over a business cycle, a
comparison of inflation at the cyclical peak and trough allows us to
measure approximately the responsiveness of inflation to disequilibrium
market conditions. Simply put, for a constant s, the change in
inflation from peak to trough is given by
(2) - = 4) (Ld - L8) - 4) (Ld - L8)t
(where the superscripts indicate peak and trough). If s1' — falls
over time through successive cycles we may conclude that there is an
increasing cyclical rigidity of inflation rates (i.e. a decreasing 4,),
when (1) the successive cycles are of similar amplitude, and (2) 4e is
Invariant over the cycle. When e varies over the cycle, — will
measure changes both in equilibrium and disequilibrium components.
We now turn to the historical evidence, using price and wage
indexes for 1890—1929 and l947—l976. Throughout this paper, the period
of the Great Depression and World War II are excluded from the analysis.
The period of the 1930s is skipped because of well—known perversities In
the wage and price dynamics of the period.3 The years of World War II
similarly must be eliminated because of the extensive administrative
control of wages and prices during the period. The empirical results
displayed in this section are for the wholesale price index (WPI) and
indexes of average hourly compensation. The calculations have also been
made for a number of other price and wage series, with very similar
results. For the sake of brevity, these additional results are not
reported, but are available from the author.
Calculations of annual inflation rates are made for seventeen
5cycles. In Table 1, we report the rates of inflation before and after
business cycle peaks for the price and wage series. Under each index,
the third column is the difference of the inflation rates from peak to
trough of the cycle. The evidence strongly supports the role of aggregate
activity on price and wage change. For the WPI, the rate of inflation
declined during every downturn from 1890 to 1948, and for three of the
five recessions after 1948. Wages, similarly, decelerated during
every contraction from 1890 to 1961, excluding the 1895—1897 period.
In complete accord with Cagan's results for the 1920s, the WPI
calculations support the hypothesis that prices have become more
cyclically rigid over time, (though of course we have as yet made no
attempt to control for cyclical severity). Almost every contraction
from 1890 to 1927 produced a sharper deceleration in price change than
did later recessions. Only the deceleration in 1949 is of similar
magnitude with the earlier cycles. It is plausible that changing weights
In the construction of the WPI might account for some of the apparent
increase in rigidity. Note, for example, that cyclically flexible
agriculture and food prices composed 43.06% of the WPI in 1926, and only
20.95% in 1970. Cagan,for a more limited time period, re—estimated
the shifts in cyclical inflation using a fixed weighting scheme, and
found very little change in the results.5 As a further check,
calculations (not shown) were made for the sub—index of industrial
goods, available from BLS since 1913. The same perceptible decline in
price flexibility is evident.
In Table 1, there is also a discernible trend toward greater







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6slowed in ten of the eleven cycles before 1930, wage change has in fact
accelerated in the last two downturns. Furthermore, the magnitudes
of deceleration before 1930 are in general far larger than the measures
for 1947—1960, where wage change did in fact slow down.
It is important to compare cycles of similar magnitude for
testing changes in cyclical wage and price flexibility. Part of the
apparent increase in rigidity is due to the relative mildness of most
of the post—1945 recessions. NBER rankings of business cycle severity
exist for 1920 to 1976. We use these rankings as a "benchmark" for a
measure covering the entire 1890—1976 period.6 In particular, a
measure of severity is calculated from the percentage deviation of
industrial output from its trend value at business cycle peaks and
troughs. The change in this output "gap" from peak to trough gauges
the amplitude of the cycle. For the years 1920 to 1976, the gap
measure and the NBER severity index yield almost Identical rank orderings.
In Table 2, the cycles are arranged according to the gap
criteria. The precise classification method is described in the table.
The evidence is rather striking. For mild contractions, downward
price flexibility seems to have ended with the pre—World War II period.
For moderate and severe contractions, similarly, the response of wages
and prices has fallen significantly since 1950.
II
The methods of Section I, though convincing in their illustration
of a trend toward decreasing cyclical changes in inflation, fail to
yield actual estimates of the Phillips curve parameters. It is shown
below, however, that traditional econometric attempts to estimate
TABLE 2
WAGE AND PRICE BEHAVIOR DURING BUSINESS CYCLES
CLASSIFIED BY CYCLICAL SEVERITY, 1890—1976
Peak—Trough A in Price Inflation A In Wage Inflation GAPX 100
Mild Contractions
1893—1894 —12.9 —12.1 —7.5
1895—1897 — 4.4 4.4 —8.5
1899—1900 — .2 — 4.2 —1.7
1910—1911 —12.5 — 4.9 —8.2
1913_1924 — 6.6 —6.7 —9.2
1926—1927 — 1.3 0.0 —3.7
1953—1954 1.5 — 2.1 —9.7
1960—1961 — .5 — 1.0 —3.9
1969—1970 .3 .2 —8.4
Moderate Contractions
1902—1904 — 5.8 — 4.2 —11.0
1913—1914 — 3.3 — 7.3 —10.5
1948—1949 —13.0 — 5.5 —10.2
1957—1958 — 1.4 — i.4 —11.4
Strong Contractions
1907—1908 — 8.4 — 8.4 —21.0
1918—1919 —16.4 —14.8 —17.4
1920—1921 —56.8 —37.4 —25.9
1973—1975 .8 2.9 —15.8
Source: Wage and price data from Table 1.
The output gap variable is calculated by regressing Log (Industrial
Production Index) on time and the rate of unemployment. The rate of un-
employment is then set at its average value, and fitted values of Log
(Industrial Production Index) are interpreted as trend values. These trend
measures are subtracted from actual values, to obtain GAPt. The calculations
were performed separately for the pre- and post-WW II period.
The cycles have been grouped by severity, according to j GAP,
where A GAP = GAPt_GAPP, the change in GAP from peak to succeeding trough.
The grouping is:
Mild contraction -10 < AGAP X 100 0
Moderate Contraction -15 < AGAP x 100 <-10
Strong Contraction AGAP x 100 <-15
7changes in the inflation-unemployment tradeoff may be flawed. In this
section, we describe a simple method for obtaining consistent estimates
of the Phillips curve coefficients. These estimates add further strong
support to the hypothesis of a decline in the short-run Phillips curve
slope.
In the standard Phillips curve analysis, (1) is estimated in
the form
() t o + Bi RUt' + 2 y (L) i_l + e
Here, y(L) denotes a polynomial of the lag operator, and RIJt1, the
inverse of the unemployment rate, substitutes for L - L in (1). RtJ
is conventionally entered in inverse form as a reflection of the
assumption of a non-linear, decreasing response of inflation to
increasing levels of unemployment. Lagged values of the unemployment
rate may also be entered. Expected inflation is measured by
y(L)t_i. The somewhat arbitrary nature of the specification
p=y(L)t_j is now well-known, after the justified criticism of rational-
expectations theorists. However, for our purposes, the distributed
lag approach may be warranted. In an economy (e.g. pre-1930) where
the macroeconomic structure is not well understood, much less precisely
estimated in econometric work, it may be "economically rational"
(see Fiege and Pearce [4] ) to use forecasts of future inflation based
upon lagged values of price change. Indeed, when parameter values of
structural equations are not known, adaptive or error-learning
procedures of forecasting inflation are often optimal forecasting
procedures.
Direct estimates of (3) were made for the pre- and post-World






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8and the structure of y(L)t. All of the regressions reported in this
paper use the measure of output gap in industrial production as the
disequilibrium variable. For a number of reasons, it is believed that
output gap should be preferred to the Lebergott series for pre-1930
labor force unemployment. The Lebergott series is subject to large
errors. The only available benchmarks for pre-1930 unemployment are
the decennial census data of 1900, 1910, and 1920. All other years must
he interpolated. Random error in the unemployment rate series would
tend to bias toward zero the estimated coefficient on RUt. Indeed,
using an instrumental variable for Rut substantially increased the
magnitude of the unemployment rate coefficient, as would be predicted
with errors-in-variables. Importantly, in the regressions we analyzed,
the results for shifts in the Phillips curve hold for both Rut and
GAPt as explanatory variables. Various attempts were made to enter
lagged values of GAPt in regression estimates of (3). When. GAPt...l was
included along with GAPt, the coefficient of the lagged variable was
small and never statistically significant, while the current variable
remained significant. When GAPt 1 was entered instead of GAPt ,
the
coefficient was almost always insignificant.
The estimates for (3) are presented in Table 3. All estimates
show a large decline in from the first to the second period, i.e.
the short-run Phillips curve is flatter in the second period, in
conformity with the findings of Section I. In all of the equations,
the short-run Phillips curve slope estimate is of the right sign and
is statistically significant. For the pre-World War II period,: varies
between .4 and .53, while for the post-World War II era, l lies
between .07 and .12. The parameter of adaptive expectations in p, X, is
not well measured, and has the wrong sign in regression (3).
9Inhis recent analysis, Wachter [17] reached very different
conclusions regarding the change of 13i over time. Wachter concluded
that the short—run Phillips Curve has become increasingly steep. Wachter's
analysis concerns the 1954—1975 period, while the present paper compares
the pre—Worid War II and post—World War II periods, so that the results
are not strictly contradictory. Yet it is still worthwhile to ask
whether Wachter's methodology might explain the variance of the results.
Wachter estimates a modified form of (2):
$o + $ RU + $2 y (L) + $ . TIME
Since
dtjji= ($i + $ TIME), Wachter avers that a positive $ should
-t
indicate a secularly increasing responsiveness of inflation to unemploy-
ment, while a negative $ should prompt the reverse conclusion. For
1954:1 to 1975:11, he finds $ > 0. Wachter errs, however, in 1eting
only the coefficienton RU-i change over tiie. If, in the true
model, either $o or $2 but not $i increases over time, then estimating
(-) will tend to give an upward biased estimate of $38 In fact, it is
far more likely that $2, the coefficient on the distributed lag on
prices, has been increasing while $i has been falling. I show below
the results of estimating Wachter's equation, without $, for.different terminal
dates. It seems clear that $ has not significantly increased, when
analyzed by a method that allows all parameters to change:9
10
TIME PERIOD
1954:1 to 1965:IV .024 .31
(1.3) (.58)
1954:1 to 1968:IV .017 .31
(1.9) (.71)
1954:1 to 1976:IV .011 .87
(2.1) (5.11)
The estimates that we have so far examined in Table 3 and
Wachter's estimates may be marred by a bias introduced in regressing
wage changes on price changes. Most current econometric price equations
confirm that prices are well described as mark—ups over standard unit
labor costs. Price changes approximately equal wage changes less trend
productivity growth, . Rewriting (3) with _1— f'_1, we have
(5) Now, if the e is a
serially correlated process, y(L)1 will be correlated with and
estimates of (5) will be biased. One standard method for dealing with
this problem is to assume a particular form for the process and to
make maximum likelihood estimates for (5) using the process explicitly.
This approach is taken in equations (5)—(6) of Table 3,
where it is assumed that et — pe 1+u, and u is ii.d. Note that p
is statistically significant in both of theseLequations. With the
auto—correlation correction, remains larger in the earlier period.
There is no particular reason, beyond convenience, to postulate
this specific autoregressive process. With three standard assumptions,
however, it is possible to skirt the statistical difficulties of the
usual analysis. The assumptions of 1) adaptive inflationary expectations,
2) no long—run inflation—unemployment tradeoff, and 3) prices as mark-
ups over standard unit labor costs, lead to the following simple model:
11
1(writing GAP for RU ):t t
(6) y + (GAP) + + e
(7) (l-A)p +
(8) Pt (1 + m)SULC (standard unit labor cost).
If trend labor productivity growth is at a constant rate j, then (8) may be
re—written as Notice that (7) may be re—written as
Using this expression with (6) and (8) we may derive
X)(p-4)
+ GAPt_GAPt l +
- ei
Through a transformation of (6) we have thus been able to eliminate the
lagged wage terms from the estimated equation. Under the assumption
that GAPE is exogenous, the estimation of ( ) by maximum liklihood or
ordinary least squares will give consistent estimates of the parameters.
Finally, note that we may find the "natural rate" of the output gap,
by setting and GAPtGAPt_l. We find GA The equation
to be estimated becomes
(jO) = _X)GAPNR + APt - GAPt i + - t1
How plausible are the assumptions underlying the present model?
Equation (1Q) suggests an historical consistency check of the model.
We can see from (10) that (GAP_GAPi) > (l—X) (GAP_GAP1) implies
12
A and t > 0. Thus, whenever aggregate activity is rising (i.e.,
CAPt — GAPt_l > 0) and employment or output In period t—l is above the
equilibrium level, inflation should intensify ( > 0). By similar
argument, whenever output is below its long—run equilibrium level, and
output is falling, inflation should be decelerating. In eleven of the years
since 1893, the economy experienced increasing output relative to potential
during a period of already high employment (GAPt1 > GAP). In ten
of these years wage Inflation accelerated as predicted. In nine years of
the periods 1893—1929 and 1948—1975, the economy was characterized by low
and falling levels of aggregate activity. In aix years, wage Inflation
showed a declining rate. khe accelerationist property is justified.
EquAtion (10) may be estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS)
or by a maximum liklihood procedure (non-linear squares). With OLS we
estimate:
(11) + 1GAP + 2GAP 1 +
Using the estimates and C2 we may obtain consistent estimates of the
underlying parameters and A. Note that plIm (C2) —, and
NR
(— A ) — —plim (C2) / plim (C1) A. In addition, since — (1—A) GAP
C1 NR
we can also obtain a consistent estimate of GAP . By use of the Fieller
Bound technique, confidence intervals may be calculated for the point esti-
mates of the underlying parameters , (see riliches [8] pp. 32-33). With
non-linear least squares (NLS), we may directly estimate the underlying
parameters of the model' Because (12) is exactly identified, i.e.,. there
is a one-to-one mapping from (C0, C1, C2) to (GAP,, A), the OLS and
NLS estimates of the underlying parameters are identical.
In Table 5, we present a summary of estimates of the model.
13
The results are encouraging. In all of the regressions, the co-
efficients are of expected sign, and are usually statistically
significant. In general, the estimates of are close to the estimates
shown in Table 3; again, declines substantially from the first period
to the second. The estimation of Table 4 was made for additional time periods and
different wage and price indexes, with little change in the results.
For all of the regressions, we cannot reject the hypothesis that
GAPNR = 0. This is an appealing result. Because GAPt is constructed
as a measure of the deviation of output from trend, the result suggests
that the long-run equilibrium value of output (GAPNR) is equal to its
trend value. On average, over extended periods, the economy is in
equilibrium. Note, finally, that there is a little evidence that A
has increased over time. If so, the mean lag of past inflation in
forecasts of future inflation, , has also lengthened over time.
1— A
While A is a crucial parameter for macroeconomic policy-making, as
we show below, it is not precisely estimated by the equations of
Table 4.
If and A can be considered as exogenous to the policy-maker
(the discussion of Section III indicates that and A change with
varying macroeconomic policies), we can describe some effects of the
shifts of the Phillips curve for policy by a simple formula. Consider
a convenient (and highly stylized) one-parameter description of
policy. For any output GAPt in year t , policy makers choose
0 0
s.GAPt as their output target in year t1. Appropriate monetary and
fiscal policies are followed so that a constant proportion (1-6) of





























































































































































































































































































































































Then it can be shown that: 12
cGAP(12) P(steady state)= p +
—Al )
Thus, starting in a recession (GAPt< 0), the following conditions imply a
high steady—state rate of inflation: (1) a rapid recovery (low 6); long
lags in expectations (h1gh); and (3) a low short—run Phillips curve
slope (small I). Given the estimates of falling and rising X, we can
understand the policy difficulty of recovering from the 1974—1975 recession.
Two further points are worthy of mention. First the path of
constant inflation is followed by setting 6 — A, as shown in equation (12).
The magnitude of the short—run Phillips curve slope is completely irrevelant
in determining this path, under assumptions of adaptive expectations Second
while a low Phillips curve slope and long lags in expectations are very
undesirable during recessions, these conditions are most desirable during
booms. A low slope and long mean lag permit an economy to operate with
output in excess of the natural rate for an extended period without a
serious acceleration of inflation. Wachter has offered evidence of
precisely this phenomenon. Since 1950, Wachter argues, there is a continuing
pattern of "smaller first—year upward responses of wages to tight market
conditions. "13
In interpreting (1 it has been assumed that is independent of
the policy parameter 6. In fact, changes in '5 over long periods of time




We have thus far seen how the parameters of the Phillips
curve have changed over time, and how these changes have implications
for economic policy. Our understanding of inflation-unemployment
interactions would be considerably enhanced by a detailed historical
discussion of how and why these changes emerged. Unfortunately,
given the immense structural shifts that have characterized in U.S.
economy since 1900, the historical exegesis is a large task, and
one that is beyond the scope of this paper. Complex changes in
product and labor markets, such as increasing concentration, higher
ratios of value added per shipment, increased unionization, and the
large increases in investment in human capital, have all played a
role in the decreased cyclical response of wage and price inflation.
In this section I shall discuss two less analyzed, though probably
very important contributors to the Phillips curve shift.
First, the emergence of countercyclical macroeconomic policy
since World War II has probably changed the cyclical behavior of
wage and price setters. Martin N. Baily [ ii has recently argued
that growing expectations of countercyclical macroeconomic policy
have smoothed the cyclical adjustments of production and employment
in the private sector. It is also likely that such expectations have
smoothed the cyclical movements of wages .and prices. I have dein-
onstrated this theoretically in Sachs [ii], and will outline the
main argument here.
A second source of cyclical rigidity is probably the spread
of long-term explicit and implicit contracts. It is well-known
that union wages are less cyclically responsive than non-union wages
17
(cf. Lewis [9], Flanagan[ 5]), and the usual explanation for this
points to the use of iong.-term wage agreements in the union sector.
Over our period of study, unionization has spread dramatically, as
has the average duration of collective bargaining agreements. This
trend could well result in secular increases in aggregate wage
rigidity. Note that the spread of long-term contracts might itself
result from the stability engendered by active macroeconomic
policy.
One explanation of the Phillips curve is that workers cut
wages when there is high unemployment because of the expectation
of contInued. low demand for labor, at given nominal wages, in the
future. To the extent that countercyclical policy breaks the link
between current unemployment and the expectation of continuing low
aggregate (nominal) demand, today's unemployment will not induce
wage cuts in contracts for succeeding periods. In a model of
macroeconomic response to a supply shock, Phelps [10] has succinctly
stated this view:'4
Suppose that wage setters expect the central bank to
accommodate the supply shock by adjusting the money
supply and thus the price level in such a way as to
hold invariant the quantity of labor that will be
demanded by firms at the pre.-existing money wage
W ... If they know they hold these beliefs in
c8mmon, then their "rational expectation" is that
the pre-shock money wage will equilibrate the labor
market as it did before the shock. Each firm will
expect the other firms to maintain their wages andit will do the same.
In Phelps' case, the slope of the short-run Phillips curve is zero,
for unemployment does not induce any wage deflation.
18
In a more general model of wage-setting in the presence of activist
policy, I have shown that the slope of the statistical Phillips curve
depends on (1) the extent of countercyclical policy, and (2) the degree
to which unanticipated changes in the money stock are countered by the
monetary authority in succeeding periods.5 Simple regressions describing
money supply growth indicate that both supply characteristics have changed
in the direction tending to reduce the Phillips curve slope.16 In the
period 1895-1929 there is no evidence of a countercyclical response of
the money supply. For 1952-1975, the regression indicates that the
money stock is raised one percent above trend in the year following a
ten percent industrial output shortfall, and more in following years.
Moreover, there is evidence of significant negative serial correlation
in the residuals of the money supply equation for 1952-1975, suggesting
that monetary authorities now act to correct partially for unexpected
money movements.
The presence of long-terni contracts fixing nominal wage
growth also reduces the short-run response of aggregate wages to
cyclical fluctuations, for two reasons. Most directly, wages fixed
by earlier contract may be unable to react at all in the short-term
to current, unexpected cyclical developments. This phenomenon is
clearly evident in Flanagan's [5] recent study of union - non-union
wage differentials. Comparing the contract (union) sector with the
non-contract sector, Flanagan writes:17
19
That differences in the cyclical sensitivity of
average union and non-union wage changes exist
is clear in the postwar data. However, it is
also clear that first year negotiated wage
changes are almost as sensitive to labor market
pressures as non-union wages. Most of the
inertia in negotiated wages is a by-product of
multi-year labor agreements. (imphasis added)
Second, we have shown in Sachs [ii] that wages determined in the
non-contract market (assumed to clear continuously) will show
smaller cyclical fluctuations the larger is the sector of labor
covered by long-term agreements. Basically, the larger is the
contract sector the smaller is the aggregate price disturbance
transmitted to the non-contract sector following an aggregate demand
shock. The disturbance is absorbed in output fluctuations in the
contract sector rather than in aggregate price fluctuations.
Assuming that the non-contract labor market is cleared at a given
real wage, the reduced aggregate price fluctuations result is smaller
wage fluctuations in that sector. These results depend on low
intersectoral mobility of labor over the cycle.
Thus the tremendous increase in duration and coverage of
collective bargaining agreements are probably important forces
behind the Phillips curve shift between the two periods. As late
as 1948, the great majority of all wage agreements were of one
year duration; by 1972, most contracts were written for three years.18
And the contracts now cover a arger portionof the work force. In
the manufacturing sector, for instance, only 11.6% of production workers
were organized in 1910, while by 1973, approximately 49% of manufacturing
production employees were organized by labor unions. Economy-wide,
5.8% of the Civilian labor force belonged to unions in 1910, while
23.4% belonged in 1970.19
20
The two explanations for increasing cyclical wage rigidity, ac-
tivist macroeconomic policy and long-term contracts, are complements
rather than strict alternatives. Indeed, when extensive empirical
tests of these and other hypotheses are carried out, a range of
explanations will surely be necessary to account for the important
changes in cycle behavior that we documented in Sections I and II
of this paper. Given the crucial importance of the Phillips curve
slope for macroeconomic policy, as suggested on p. 15, this research
should soon be undertaken.
NOTES
1Phillip Cagan, "Changes in the Recession Behavior of Wholesale
Prices in the 1920's and Post-WW II," Exploration in Economic Research,
Vol. 2, No. 1 (1975), pp. 54-55.
2Michael Wachter, "The Changing Cyclical Responsiveness of Wage
Inflation," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1976:1, p. 116.
3With unemployment hovering above 20% in 1933, prices and wage
stopped a four-year fall, and actually began to rise at significant
rates. The Wholesale Price Index rose an average of 6.7% per year from
1933 to 1937 while the NIA wage measure for manufacturing workers in-
creased an average of 5.9% per year. Wachter [17] notes that
there is evidence that governmont measures to spur recovery
were behind the upward movement in wages. The spurt in the
early 1930's is generally attributed to the National Industrial
Relations Act, and Wagner Act and the subsequent growth of
unions may have been responsible for that of the late 1930's (p. 155).
Freedman and Schwartz [ 7] reach similar conclusions. In
accounting for the large rise in the WPI, they cite
the explicit measures to raise wages and prices undertaken
with government encouragement and assistance, notable,NIRA, the
Guffey Coal Act, the agriculture price-support program, and the
National Labor Relations Act. (p. 233)
Because of these complex institutional changes, the Great
Depression is not in the interval of analysis.
4Close comparability in wage data for the two periods requires
focusing on the manufacturing sector, given data limitations in the
earlier period. For the recent period, we have compared Phillips
curves estimated with manufacturing sector and economy-wide wages as
the dependent variable, finding very little difference in cyclical
responsiveness.
5See Cagan, bc. cit., pp. 99-100.
6See Annual Report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1973.
New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 1973, p. 18,
and other issues of Annual Report.
7See, for example, R. Lucas, "Econometric Testing of The Natural
Rate Hypothesis," in 0. Eckstein (ed.) The EcOnOmótrics of Price
Determination (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 1972)
8Suppose, for example, that the curve's intercept but not
slope has been increasing over time, so that
= + A TIME + (RU') + 2y(L)_1, A1 >0
is the true model. If equation (:4) is estimated instead, it is
21
easily shown that plini (3) = A1 reg (TIME, GAP TIME 1 y(L)p , RU;'),
where the term reg ( • ) is the multiple regression coefficient f
AP•TIME in a regression of TIME on GAP•TIME, y(L)t_i, and RU1. Thus,
would tend to be positive even though is in fac zero.
9The equation = o + + 2y(L)pt..l is estimated for
quarterly data. w is the average hourly earnings in manufacturing;
Rut is the unemployment rate for males age 25+; Pt is the non-form
deflator and y(L) is a 3rd degree PDL of length 16 quarter, unconstrained
at both ends.
years 1894, 1896, 1900, 1921, 1960, 1961, 1971, 1974, and
1975,GAPt < GAP.,.1 < 0. In six of nine years wage inflation decelerated
as expected: l84, 1900, 1921, 1960, 1961, and 1971. In years 1902, 1906,
1910, 1913, 1916, 1926, 1929, 1951, 1953, 1966 and 1968, GAP.,. >
GAPt_1 > 0. In all but one year (1953) wage change increasea as predicted.
'1Note that Ut in (11) is equal to et - et_,, from (11).
There is no more nor less reason to believe that Ut is i.i.d.
than to believe that et is i.i.d. The coefficient estimates from an
NLS (or OLS) regression of (12) will be consistent whether or not u
is i.i.d., though efficiency, and consistency of the estimates of
the standard errors require that Ut be i.i.d.
12For a policy rate , we can easily calculate the steady-state
conditions for an initial GAP and rate of inflation. Since - Pti =
GAPt - GAPt 1 (from (11) setting et = e = GAPNR = 0):t-i.
T T T
(1.a) (Pt - t_) = (t_ GAPt) - 4GAP._
t=i t=l A t=i
But GAPt = tGAPt , by assumption. Replacing this relation in equation(1.a) we find: °
(2.a) T T T-1
(t - -i) = L GAPt0 - qGAP0
t=1 A =, t=0
or, simplifying:
(3.a) - = GAP (6 8'1) - 4GAPt (16T).T 0 t0 ( 1—6) 0 1—6 )
To find the steady state condition, take the limit with respect to T
of (3.a), and rearrange:




'3M. Wachter, bc. cit., p. 153.
14E. Phelps, "Commodity - Supply Shocks and Full-Employment
Monetary Policy," Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol. 10,
No. 2, (May, 1978), P. 209.
'5Condition (1) is the one described by Phelps. Conditiou (2)
results from the fact that any period's CAPt is in part due to un-
expected movements of the money stock, Mt. If Mt falls below anticipated
levels, output will drop. The decline in M4 reduces expectations of
future full-employment nominal wages only ir the shortfall is permanent
(i.e. as long as the central bank does not act to "correct" the
shortfall in Mt by reflating next period). To the extent that the
drop in money growth is not counteracted, CAPt < 0 will be followed by
a reduction in - Wt.
16The regressions relate money growth to lagged money growth
and lagged output gap, in an equation similar to Barro [2]. For
MtC1
+
CL1 Mt.i CL 2 t-2 + CL3 Mt3 +C4 CAPt 1 + t= Put_i + et
a
cL3 c p
1895—1929 .07 -.31 -.11 .27 .06 .17 .605
(2.54) (1.4) (.62) (1.6) (.42) (1.02)
1952-1975 .09 .55 - .20 .56 -.1i -.53 .49
(1.05) (2.45) (.82) (2.78) (1.48) (2.99)
where tM is log (M2)_log (M2)i, for the M2 definition of the money
stock. ources for M2 are given in the Data Appendix.
Flanagan, "Wage Interdependence in Unionized Labor Markets,"
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3, 1978, p. 673
18The classification of union labor-agreements by contract duration
yields the following percentage breakdown for 1948 and 1972:







The 1948 data are from Woytinsky [19J and the I972.datä.arefrom;




[6 , p. 44].
calculated by
Statistics of
membership in the manufacturing sector, 1910, is from
Data for 1973 are found in Freeman and Medoff
The economy-wide percentage union membership is
dividing Series D952 by Series D4 and D14 in Historical





1. Compensation per Hour, Manufacturing
1890-1945: Series B72 of Loni-Te flconomic Growth, 1860-1965 114].
The Rees time series is expressed in constant 1957 dollars. To get
nominal wages, the wage series was multiplied, by the CPI, Series
E 135 in [14].
1950-1976: Hourly compensation in Manufacturing, found in United
States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Labor Statistics [16].
Comparisons of wage behavior were made for other series as well. In
particular, the results of the paper were consistently verified for:
2. Average Hourly Earnings in Manufacturing
1890-1926: Series D769-770 of Historical Statistics of the United
States [13], developed by Douglas.
1950-1976: Average Hourly Earnings, Manufacturing Sector, U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of
Labor Statistics, 1977 (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1977), p. 81.
Economy-wide wage behavior was studied in the current period using Series
745 in Business Conditions Digest [12]. This series, "Average Hourly
Compensation, All Employees in Private Nonform Economy," was found to behave




1890-1945: Series B62, Long-Term Economic Growth, 1860-1965 [14].
1948-1976: Series 310, Business Conditions Digest [12].
2. Wholesale Prices
1890-1945: Series B69, Long-Term Economic Growth, 1860-1965 [14].





1390-1945: Series A15, Long-Term Economic Growth, 1860-1965 [14].
1948-1976: Series 47, Business Conditions Digest [12).
Uneip1oyinent Rate, All Civilian Workers
1890-1929: Series B1, Lon&-Term Economic Growth, 1860-1965 [14].
1945-1976: Series 43, Business Conditions Digest [12].
Money Stock M2
1890-1929: Series X415, Historical Statistics of the United States [13].
1945-1976: Series 102, Business Conditions Digest [12].
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